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Abstract
Westudy general dynamic programmingproblemswith continuous anddiscrete choices
and general constraints.e value functions may have kinks arising () at indiﬀerence
points between discrete choices and () at constraint boundaries. Nevertheless, we es-
tablish a general envelope theorem: ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary at interior op-
timal choices. We only assume diﬀerentiability of the utility function with respect to
the continuous choices.e continuous choice may be from any Banach space and the
discrete choice from any non-empty set.
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
 Introduction
Optimization problems that involve both discrete and continuous choices are common in
economics. Examples include the trade-oﬀ between consumption and savings alongside
the discrete decision of whether to work, accept a job oﬀer, declare bankruptcy, go to col-
lege, or enroll children in child care.¹ In addition, we show how non-smooth optimization
problems, such as capital adjustment in the presence of ﬁxed costs, may be recast as mixed
continuous and discrete choice problems. In the absence of lotteries or other smoothing
mechanisms, such problems create kinks in the value function where agents are indiﬀerent
between two discrete choices. A second type of kink arises when constraints become bind-
ing. As a result, the value function is non-diﬀerentiable, non-concave, and may even lack
directional derivatives. Can ﬁrst-order conditions be applied under such circumstances?
is paper provides two general envelope theorems. e ﬁrst relates to static optimiza-
tion problems. Figure a illustrates an example where an investor maximizes his proﬁt by
choosing the size of his investment, c, and the product, d1 or d2, to invest in. e investor
takes the upper envelope over the two per-product proﬁts f and maximizes it with respect
to the continuous choice c. We assume f (; d) is diﬀerentiable for each discrete choice
d 2 fd1; d2g. Observe in the ﬁgure that the upper envelope has only downward kinks but
no upward kinks. Moreover, maxima may not occur at downward kinks. erefore, our
static envelope theorem concludes that interior maxima only occur at diﬀerentiable points.
In other words, at an investment level where the investor is indiﬀerent between the two
products, he strictly prefers to increase the investment and choose product d1, or decrease
the investment and choose product d2. Amir, Mirman and Perkins (, Lemma .) and
Milgrom and Segal (, Corollary ) provide special cases of this theorem under the as-
sumptions of supermodularity and equidiﬀerentiability, respectively.²
Our second envelope theorem applies this intuition to dynamic settings.When an agent
makes both discrete and continuous choices subject to some constraint, the value function
has (potentially inﬁnitely many) kinks. In Figure b, c represents eﬀort, and the two curves
represent the payoﬀs from attending college or not. As before, discrete choices may lead
to downward kinks. In addition, binding constraints may lead to upward (or downward)
kinks. Nevertheless, we show that at interior optimal choices, the value function is diﬀeren-
tiable; the agent never chooses a savings level where he is indiﬀerent between college or not.³
More speciﬁcally, our theorem applies if the choice is an optimal one-period interior choice,
¹ Eckstein and Wolpin (), Rust (), or Aguirregabiria and Mira () list many more examples.
² A totally diﬀerent approach by Renou and Schlag () does not study derivatives at all but uses the
weaker notion of “ordients” (ordered gradients).
³ In complementary work, Rincón-Zapatero and Santos () study the diﬀerentiability of value func-
tions at boundary choices.

which means the agent is able to increase or decrease his continuous choice today without
changing any other choices. For example, this condition is met if the agent can increase or
decrease his savings today without changing his college or future savings decisions.
Previous envelope theorems in dynamic settings do not accommodate discrete choices
and impose additional assumptions. Mirman and Zilcha (, Lemma ) and Benveniste
and Scheinkman (, eorem ) impose concavity assumptions, and Amir et al. (,
Lemma .) assume supermodularity.
.
f (c; d) ; F (c)
c
f (c; d1)
f (c; d2)
F (c)
(a) Static Problem
.
V (c)
c
V (c)
Downward Kink
(discrete choice)
Upward Kink
(binding constraint)
(b) Constrained Dynamic Problem
Figure : Mixed continuous and discrete choice problems
e concept of directional derivatives is central to the proofs of previous envelope the-
orems. However, in our fully general setting, directional derivatives may not exist every-
where, so a new approach is required. We apply Fréchet sub- and superdiﬀerentials, and
their one-dimensional analogues which we call Dini sub- and superdiﬀerentials.⁴ey cap-
ture what we think of as upward and downward kinks.
is paper is organized as follows: Section  states our envelope theorems. All proofs go
into Section  which contains additional general lemmata on kinks and upper envelopes.
ere, we also discuss the relationship of our results to previous publications. Section 
illustrates the breadth of applications of our envelope theorems to non-smooth and non-
concave dynamic programming problems. e proofs of the Banach space versions of our
theorems are in the appendix. Nevertheless, we recommend reading them as they are more
elegant (but less intuitive) than the standard versions.
⁴e terminology “Dini sub- and superdiﬀerential” does not appear to be widespread. On the other hand,
“Fréchet sub- and superdiﬀerential” is a standard generalization of the convex analysis notion of “subdiﬀer-
ential” to non-convex functions.

 Theorems
An agent makes a continuous choice c 2 C and a discrete choice d 2 D. Initially, we require
the continuous choice set C to be a subset of R; Appendix A generalizes all theorems to
allowC to be a subset of any Banach space.We allow the discrete choice setD to be any non-
empty set, e.g. a ﬁnite set such as ffull time work; part time work; not workg, a continuous
space such as R2, or an inﬁnite dimensional space such as C[0; 1].
Deﬁnition . We say F is the upper envelope of ff (; d)gd2D if F (c) = supd2D f (c; d).
Our static envelope theoremasserts that non-diﬀerentiable points are never optimal choices.
An agent is never indiﬀerent between two discrete choices aer making an optimal contin-
uous choice (unless the discrete choices are locally equivalent).
eorem . Suppose F is the upper envelope of a (possibly inﬁnite) set of diﬀerentiable func-
tions ff (; d)g. If (c^; d^) maximizes f , and c^ 2 int (C), then F is diﬀerentiable at c^ and
satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition F 0 (c^) = fc(c^; d^) = 0.
Note that this theorem requires that the supremum be attained at the optimal choice c^, but
not elsewhere.
Our second result builds on eorem  to study dynamic programming problems with
continuous and discrete choices. In every period, the agentmakes a continuous and discrete
choice (c0; d0) based on the state variable (c; d) consisting of the previous period’s choices.
We denote the set of possible states by 
. e agent may only make choices that satisfy the
constraint
(c; c0; d; d0) 2  :
It will be convenient to write
  (c; ; d; ) = f(c0; d0) : (c; c0; d; d0) 2  g
  (c; ; d; d0) = fc0 : (c; c0; d; d0) 2  g
  (; c0; d; d0) = fc : (c; c0; d; d0) 2  g :
Let us assume that the agent has a feasible choice at every state, i.e.  (c; ; d; )  
 is non-
empty for all (c; d) 2 
.
Problem . Consider the following dynamic programming problem:
V (c; d) = sup
(c0;d0)2 (c;;d;)
u (c; c0; d; d0) +  V (c0; d0) ; ()

where the domain of V is 
. We assume that u(; c0; d; d0) and u(c; ; d; d0) are diﬀerentiable
on int( (; c0; d; d0)) and int( (c; ; d; d0)), respectively.⁵⁶
ere are two sources of non-diﬀerentiability in Problem . As before, the value function
may have downward kinks at states where the agent is indiﬀerent between two discrete
choices. In addition, Problem  introduces constraints. Hence, the value functionmay have
upward (or downward) kinks at states where the agentmakes a boundary choice, but prefers
an interior choice at some nearby states. As in eorem , our approach is to focus on
diﬀerentiability at optimal choices away from boundaries.
We deﬁne interior choices as follows. First, the continuous component of the choice
(c0; d0)must satisfy the standard requirement that it is in the interior of today’s feasible set.
In addition, a second –more subtle – requirement is necessary. Suppose that the agent plans
to choose (c00; d00) tomorrow aer choosing (c0; d0) today. If the agent were to change c0 a lit-
tle bit, then (c00; d00)might become infeasible. If (c00; d00) is a particularly good choice for the
agent tomorrow, the agent would eﬀectively be constrained to choices today which make
(c00; d00) feasible tomorrow. erefore, the notion of interior choice must take into account
the constraint imposed by the subsequent choice of the agent. We require that (c00; d00) re-
mains feasible aer all suﬃciently small changes in c0.⁷ese two considerations lead to the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition . e choice c0 is a one-period interior choice with respect to (c; c00; d; d0; d00) if
(i) c0 2 int( (c; ; d; d0)) and
(ii) c0 2 int( (; c00; d0; d00)).
We establish that the value function is diﬀerentiable at optimal interior choices.
eorem . Suppose (c^0; d^0) and (c^00; d^00) are optimal choices at states (c; d) and (c^0; d^0), re-
spectively. If c^0 is a one-period interior choice with respect to (c; c^00; d; d^0; d^00), then V (; d^0) is
diﬀerentiable at c^0 and satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
 uc0(c; c^0; d; d^0) =  Vc(c^0; d^0) =  uc(c^0; c^00; d^0; d^00):
⁵ Since we neither study nor require the existence of optimal policies or value functions, we do not impose
conditions such as  2 (0; 1). In particular, if the value function takes inﬁnite values, then there are no
maxima and the conditions for our theorems are violated.
⁶ is notation accommodates non-stationary problems. For example, the discrete choice setD could be
constructed asD = [1t=0Dt, where each pair of setsDt andDt0 is disjoint, and  (c; c0; d; )  Dt+1 for all
d 2 Dt and all c; c0 2 C .
⁷ is second condition is somewhat familiar. Benveniste and Scheinkman () require that (c; c^0) 2
int( ) where c^0 is an optimal choice at state c. eir condition is used to establish a stronger version of sub-
diﬀerentiability. However, this part of their proof only requires c 2 int( (; c^0))which is similar to our second
condition.

e optimal one-period interior choice condition of the theorem is unusual as it requires
the existence of an optimal continuous choice c^00 tomorrow (as well as today). Nevertheless,
this condition is quite weak in three regards. First, it is only relevant when the problem has
constraints; it is automatically satisﬁed if all continuous choices are made from open sets.
Second, the condition does not require the optimal continuous choice tomorrow c^00 to be
an interior choice. ird, the condition does not require the value function to be diﬀeren-
tiable at tomorrow’s optimal choice (or anywhere else). Even if the agent chooses a kink
point tomorrow, the theorem still applies so long as it is feasible for him to change today’s
choice c^0 without changing his other choices. Still, the one-period interior choice condition
may fail and we explore how to apply eorem  in such cases in Section .
A natural extension of Problem  is the following version of a dynamic programming prob-
lem that incorporates stochastic shocks.
Problem . Consider the following stochastic dynamic programming problem:
V (c; d; ) = sup
(c0;d0)2 (c;;d;;)
u (c; c0; d; d0; ) + 
X
02
 (0j ) V (c0; d0; 0) ;
where the domain of V is 
  . We assume that u(; c0; d; d0; ) and u(c; ; d; d0; ) are
diﬀerentiable on int( (; c0; d; d0; )) and int( (c; ; d; d0; )), respectively.
efollowing theoremestablishes that the value function is diﬀerentiable at optimal choices.
It is a stochastic version of eorem .
Deﬁnition. echoice c0 is a stochastic one-period interior choicewith respect to (c; c00(); d; d0; d00())
at  if
(i) c0 2 int( (c; ; d; d0; )) and
(ii) c0 2 int( (; c00(0); d0; d00(0); 0)) for all 0.
eorem. Suppose (c^0; d^0) are optimal choices following (c; d; ) in Problem, and (c^00(); d^00())
are optimal policies for the following period’s choices as a function of 00. If c^0 is a one-period
interior choice with respect to (c; c^00(); d; d^0; d^00()), then V (; d^0) is diﬀerentiable at c^0 and
satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
 uc0(c; c^0; d; d^0; ) = 
X
0
(0j)Vc(c^0; d^0; 0) = 
X
0
(0j)uc(c^0; c^00(0); d^0; d^00(0); 0):
We omit the proof of this theorem, as it is a straightforward generalization of eorem .
emain diﬀerence is that there is a convex combination of value functions in the Bellman
equation, rather than one single value function.is requires a simple generalization of the
upcoming Lemma  part (iii) to ﬁnite sums. Generalizing to continuous random variables
would require generalizing this lemma to integrals.

 Proofs
. Classiﬁcation of Non-Diﬀerentiable Points
is section develops a classiﬁcation of non-diﬀerentiable points of functions. We deﬁne
upward and downward kinks in terms of (Dini) sub- and superderivatives. en, we show
that every non-diﬀerentiable point is either an upward or a downward kink and provide a
lemma on important algebraic operations.
Intuitively, we would like to deﬁne an upward kink as a point where the slope approach-
ing from the le is greater than the slope approaching from the right (see Figure a). Down-
ward kinks would have the converse property.
.
Downward Kink
Upward Kink
(a) Upward and Downward Kinks
.
(b) Bouncing Ball Function
Figure : Classifying non-diﬀerentiable points
However, we can not use directional derivatives because they may not exist. For in-
stance, consider the bouncing ball function F depicted in Figure b as the upper envelope
of a countable set of parabolas ff(; d)gd2D where
f (c; d) =   1jdj (c  d)

c  d
2

and D =
n s
2n
: s 2 f 1; 1g ; n 2 N
o
:
is function has directional derivatives everywhere except at c = 0. In particular, the right
directional derivative at c = 0,
lim
c!0+
F (c)  F (0)
c
does not exist because the slope oscillates between 0 and (
p
2 1)2.We resolve this problem
by taking limits inferior and superior of the slope, which always exist. According to our

classiﬁcation, c = 0 is a downward kink but not an upward kink.⁸
Deﬁnition . e (Dini) sub- and superdiﬀerentials of f at c 2 int(C) are
@Df (c) =

m 2 R : lim sup
c!0 
f (c+c)  f (c)
c
 m  lim inf
c!0+
f (c+c)  f (c)
c

@Df (c) =

m 2 R : lim inf
c!0 
f (c+c)  f (c)
c
 m  lim sup
c!0+
f (c+c)  f (c)
c

:
If @Df (c) is non-empty, then we say f is (Dini) subdiﬀerentiable at c. Similarly, if @Df (c) is
non-empty, then we say f is (Dini) superdiﬀerentiable at c.
Deﬁnition . If f is not subdiﬀerentiable at c, then we say it has an upward kink at c. Simi-
larly, if f is not superdiﬀerentiable at c, then we say it has a downward kink at c.
e following lemma establishes that a non-diﬀerentiable point of a function can be classi-
ﬁed as either an upward kink or a downward kink.
Lemma  (Diﬀerentiability). A function f : R ! R is diﬀerentiable at c if and only if f
is both sub- and superdiﬀerentiable at c. Moreover, if f is diﬀerentiable at c then ff 0 (c)g =
@Df (c) = @
Df (c).
Proof. e forward direction is straightforward. For the reverse direction, suppose that f is
both sub- and superdiﬀerentiable at c, so that there existm 2 @Df(c) andm 2 @Df(c).
From the deﬁnitions,
lim sup
c!0 
f (c+c)  f (c)
c
 m  lim inf
c!0+
f (c+c)  f (c)
c
lim inf
c!0 
f (c+c)  f (c)
c
 m  lim sup
c!0+
f (c+c)  f (c)
c
:
Since inﬁma are weakly less than suprema, going clockwise, each expression is weakly less
than the following one. erefore, all of the expressions are equal. us, f is diﬀerentiable
at c with f 0(c) = m = m.
e following lemmaprovides some calculus properties of sub- and superdiﬀerentials. Part (iii)
provides a suﬃcient condition for the diﬀerentiability of a sum of functions, and plays an
important role in the proof of eorem .
⁸ In similar examples, there are points that are both upward and downward kinks. For example, the func-
tion f(x) = x sin 1x has an upward and downward kink at x = 0.

Lemma  (Diﬀerential Calculus). e following statements are true at any c (along with their
superdiﬀerentiable counterparts):
(i) If g and h are subdiﬀerentiable, then so is g + h.
(ii) g is subdiﬀerentiable if and only if g is superdiﬀerentiable.
(iii) If g and h are subdiﬀerentiable and g + h is superdiﬀerentiable, then g, h, and g + h
are diﬀerentiable.
Proof. (i) is result follows from the subadditivity property of limits superior that al-
lows us to write
lim sup
c!0 
[g (c) + h (c)]  lim sup
c!0 

g (c) + lim sup
c!0 
h (c)

= lim sup
c!0 
g (c) + lim sup
c!0 
h (c) ;
and the analogous right limit inferior inequality.
(ii) Trivial.
(iii) From part (i), g+ h is subdiﬀerentiable, and hence diﬀerentiable by Lemma . From
part (ii),  g is superdiﬀerentiable, and part (i) implies h = (g + h) + ( g) is su-
perdiﬀerentiable. erefore, Lemma  implies h is diﬀerentiable.
History: e notions of a Dini sub- and superdiﬀerentials of one-dimensional functions
are special cases of Fréchet sub- and superdiﬀerentials of functions on Banach spaces. For
simplicity, the body of our paper uses Dini sub- and superdiﬀerentials (generalizations of
all results are in Appendix A). However, we will discuss the history here in terms of the
non-smooth analysis literature which focuses on Fréchet sub- and superdiﬀerentials.
e notions of Fréchet sub- and superdiﬀerentials generalize classical notions from
convex analysis to non-convex functions. However, according to Kruger (), previous
work in mathematics has not applied these concepts because of “rather poor calculus” as
@F (f + g)(x) 6= @Ff(x) + @Fg(x). Our approach appears to be novel: we simultaneously
study sub- and superdiﬀerentiability of functions to establish full diﬀerentiability.
e notions of Fréchet sub- and superdiﬀerentials deﬁned in Appendix A are standard,
and appear in Schirotzek (, Chapter ), although Fréchet superdiﬀerentials only ap-
pear in a two-page section on Hamilton-Jacobi equations. e special case of Dini sub-

and superdiﬀerentials is non-standard. e pioneering papers that lead to these deﬁni-
tions are Clarke (, ), Penot (, ), and Bazaraa, Goode and Nashed ().
Lemma A. – the Banach space version of Lemma  – appears without proof as Proposi-
tion . in Kruger (), but does not appear in Schirotzek. Parts (i) and (ii) of LemmaA.
– theBanach space version of Lemma– appearwithout proof in the discussion onpages 
and  of Schirotzek, respectively. We believe part (iii) is novel.
. Proof ofeorem 
To establish eorem , we prove that
(i) non-diﬀerentiable points are either upward or downward kinks or both (Lemma ),
(ii) optimal choices may not occur at downward kinks (Lemma , Figure a), and
(iii) upper envelopes may not contain upward kinks (Lemma , Figure b).
Lemma . If c^ 2 int(C) is a maximum of g : R! R, then g is superdiﬀerentiable at c^ with
0 2 @Dg(c^).
Proof. Since c^ is a maximum, the slope on the le is weakly positive, and the slope on the
right is weakly negative. In other words, for anyc > 0,
g (c^ c)  g (c)
 c  0 
g (c^+c)  g (c)
c
:
Taking limits gives
lim inf
c!0 
g (c^+c)  g (c)
c
 0  lim sup
c!0+
g (c^+c)  g (c)
c
;
which establishes 0 2 @Dg(c^).
Lemma . If F is the upper envelope of a (possibly inﬁnite) set of diﬀerentiable functions
ff (; d)g, and c 2 int(C), andF (c) = f(c; d^), thenF is subdiﬀerentiable at cwith fc(c; d^) 2
@DF (c).
Proof. Since d^ is an optimal choice at c but (perhaps) not at c+c,
f

c+c; d^

  f

c; d^

 F (c+c)  F (c) :

.
c^
(a) Lemma 
.
c^
(b) Lemma 
Figure : Illustration of Proof of eorem 
Dividing byc > 0, and taking limits gives
fc

c; d^

 lim inf
c!0+
F (c+c)  F (c)
c
:
Similarly, dividing byc < 0 and taking limits gives
fc

c; d^

 lim sup
c!0 
F (c+c)  F (c)
c
:
erefore, fc(c; d^) 2 @DF (c).
We are ready now to proveeorem  which is restated here.
eorem . Suppose F is the upper envelope of a (possibly inﬁnite) set of diﬀerentiable func-
tions ff (; d)g. If (c^; d^) maximizes f , and c^ 2 int (C), then F is diﬀerentiable at c^ and
satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition F 0 (c^) = fc(c^; d^) = 0.
Proof. Lemmata  and  establish that F is super- and subdiﬀerentiable at c^ with 0 2
@DF (c^) and fc(c^; d^) 2 @DF (c^). Applying Lemma , we conclude that F is diﬀerentiable at
c^ with F 0(c^) = 0 = fc(c^; d^).
History: We sketch the history of the proof steps (i)–(iii). Mirman and Zilcha (,
Lemma ) introduced (iii) in the context of a growth model. Instead of using (ii), they
ensure that there are no downward kinks by assuming that the objective is jointly concave
in all choices. eir proofs are based on directional derivatives, which exist everywhere on
concave functions.⁹ Benveniste and Scheinkman () generalize their theorem.
⁹ Rockafellar (, eorem .) proves the existence of directional derivatives of concave functions,
which he traces as far back as Stolz (, Satz , p. ) who describes it as a standard result from geometry.

Amir et al. (, Lemmata . and .) introduced the proof strategy of (i)–(iii), also
in the context of a growthmodel. To ensure that directional derivatives exist in step (i), they
impose a supermodularity assumption on the underlying objective function.
Milgrom and Segal (, Corollary ) were the ﬁrst to notice that this logic applies
without any topological or monotonicity assumptions on the discrete choice setD. To en-
sure that directional derivatives exist in step (i), they assumed that ff(; d)gd2D is an equid-
iﬀerentiable set of functions.¹⁰ eir eorem  generalizes Clarke (, eorem .),
which in turn generalizes Danskin (, eorem ).
. Proof ofeorem 
In this section, we proveeorem  which is restated here:
eorem . Suppose (c^0; d^0) and (c^00; d^00) are optimal choices at states (c; d) and (c^0; d^0), re-
spectively. If c^0 is a one-period interior choice with respect to (c; c^00; d; d^0; d^00), then V (; d^0) is
diﬀerentiable at c^0 and satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
 uc0(c; c^0; d; d^0) =  Vc(c^0; d^0) =  uc(c^0; c^00; d^0; d^00):
e following lemma implies that V (; d^0) is subdiﬀerentiable at the optimal choice c^0 when
c^0 2 int( (; c^00; d^0; d^00)). In other words, upward kinks may only arise when a constraint
binds on today’s choice; upward kinks in the value function at future dates do not propagate
backwards. Note that the lemma is written with diﬀerent timing, and is applicable in amore
general setting than the theorem.
Lemma. Suppose (c^0; d^0) are optimal choices given (c; d) in Problem. If c 2 int( (; c^0; d; d^0)),
then the value function V (; d) is subdiﬀerentiable at c with uc(c; c^0; d; d^0) 2 @DV (c; d).
Proof. For all c+c 2  (; c^0; d; d^0), we have the inequality
V (c+c; d)  V (c; d)

h
u

c+c; c^0; d; d^

+  V

c^0; d^0
i
 
h
u

c; c^0; d; d^

+  V

c^0; d^0
i
= u

c+c; c^0; d; d^

  u

c; c^0; d; d^

:
Since c 2 int( (; c^0; d; d^0)), this inequality holds for allc in an open neighborhood of 0.
Dividing both sides byc > 0 and taking limits gives
lim inf
c!0+
V (c+c; d)  V (c; d)
c
 uc

c; c^0; d; d^0

:
¹⁰ A set of functions ff(c; )gd2D is equidiﬀerentiable at c if [f(c+c; d)  f(c; d)] /c converges uni-
formly asc! 0.

Similarly, dividing both sides byc < 0 and taking limits gives
lim sup
c!0 
V (c+c; d)  V (c; d)
c
 uc

c; c^0; d; d^0

:
erefore, V (; d) is subdiﬀerentiable at c with uc(c; c^0; d; d^0) 2 @DV (c; d).
It remains to show that V (; d^0) is superdiﬀerentiable at the optimal choice c^0. e Bellman
equation in Problem  may be decomposed into the recursive equations
v (c0; c; d) = sup
d02 (c;c0;d;)
u (c; c0; d; d0) +  V (c0; d0) (a)
V (c; d) = sup
c02C
v (c0; c; d) (b)
s.t. c0 2   (c; ; d; d0) for some d0 2 D.
Our approach is to strip away the operations on the right side of (a) until we arrive at
V , showing that each expression is superdiﬀerentiable at each step. Surprisingly, the subd-
iﬀerentiability of V (; d^0) established above plays a key role.
Since eorem  requires that the optimal choice c^0 lies in int( (c; ; d; d^0)), Lemma 
implies that v(; c; d) is superdiﬀerentiable at c^0, and 0 is a superderivative.
e right side of (a) can be written as
G (c0) = sup
d02 (c;c0;d;)
g (c0; d0) (a)
g (c0; d0) = u (c; c0; d; d0) +  V (c0; d0) : (b)
Part (i) of the following lemma establishes that g(; d^0) is also superdiﬀerentiable at c^0 with
a superderivative of 0. e lemma applies to general static optimization problems and may
be applied by setting f = g and F = G.
Lemma . Suppose F is the upper envelope of a set of functions ff(; d)g, and that F (c) =
f(c; d).
(i) IfF is superdiﬀerentiable at c, then f(; d) is also superdiﬀerentiable at cwith@Df(c; d) 
@DF (c).
(ii) If f(; d) is subdiﬀerentiable at c, thenF is also subdiﬀerentiable at cwith@Df(c; d) 
@DF (c
).

Proof. We only present the proof of part (i), as the proof for part (ii) is analogous. Since F
is superdiﬀerentiable at c, there is some slopem 2 @DF (c) with
lim inf
c!0 
F (c +c)  F (c)
c
 m  lim sup
c!0+
F (c +c)  F (c)
c
:
Since F (c)  f(c; d), we know that
F (c +c)  F (c)  f (c +c; d)  f (c; d) :
Dividing byc > 0 and taking limits, we ﬁnd that
m  lim sup
c!0+
F (c +c)  F (c)
c
 lim sup
c!0+
f (c +c; d)  f (c; d)
c
:
Along with the analogous inequality on the le, this establishesm 2 @Df(c; d).
So far, we have established that g(; d^0) is superdiﬀerentiable at c^0 and that each term in its
sum is subdiﬀerentiable. erefore, Lemma  part (iii) implies g(; d^0) and V (; d^0) are dif-
ferentiable at c^0.We also established that 0 is a superderivative of g(; d^0) anduc(c^0; c^00; d^0; d^00)
is a subderivative of V (; d^0), so these are in fact the derivatives. e equality of eorem 
follows, and this completes the proof.
History: Lemma  is a straightforward generalization of Lemma , whose history is dis-
cussed above. e early envelope theorems for dynamic programming problems (Mirman
and Zilcha (, Lemma ) and Benveniste and Scheinkman ()) imposed concavity
assumptions to establish a form of superdiﬀerentiability to complete the proof. In particu-
lar, part (ii) of Lemma  – which we did not use to prove the theorem – is reminiscent of
Benveniste and Scheinkman (, Lemma ). e proof of Amir et al. (, Lemma .)
has a similar structure to our eorem . However, in their setting the ﬂow value is diﬀer-
entiable, so their proof is simpler.
 Applications
To illustrate how broadly our theorems may be applied, we present two examples. e ﬁrst
is a classical dynamic programming problem with binary labor choice.is is a straightfor-
ward application ofeorem .e second is a capital adjustment problemwith ﬁxed costs.
In this application, the optimal one-period interior choice condition fails, but nevertheless
eorem  may be applied.

Binary Labor Choice: Consider the following dynamic programming problemwith con-
sumption, savings, and a discrete labor choice:
W (a) = max
(c;a0;`)2R3
u (c; `) +  W (a0)
s.t. c  0; a0  0; ` 2 f0; 1g ;
c+ a0 = Ra+ w `;
()
where u (; `) is diﬀerentiable and  2 (0; 1). To apply eorem , we reformulate the
problem as follows:
~W (a; L) = max
(a0;L0)2 (a;;L;)
u (Ra+ wL0   a0; L0) +  ~W (a0; L0) ;
where   = f(a; a0;L;L0) : (a; L) 2 
; (a0; L0) 2 
; R a+ wL0   a0  0g
and 
 = [0;1) f0; 1g :
Note the abuse of notation: L0 = ` is the labor supplied today. is means that ~W does not
depend on its second argument `, (i.e. ~W (; L) = W for all L) as yesterday’s labor choice is
not pay-oﬀ relevant today.
Suppose L^, a^0, and c^ are optimal choices given a, and that c^0 is an optimal choice given
a^0.¹¹ e optimal one-period interior choice condition of eorem  is that (i) c^ > 0 and
a^0 > 0, and (ii) c^0 > 0. is condition is very weak in the context of this problem. If the
agent’s preferences satisfy the Inada condition that the marginal utility of consumption at
c = 0 is inﬁnite, then c^ > 0 and c^0 > 0 are satisﬁed, leaving only the standard require-
ment that the savings choice a^0 must be interior. If this condition is met, then the theorem
establishes that ~W (; L^0) is diﬀerentiable at a^0, and the ﬁrst-order condition
uc

c^; L^0

=

R
~Wa0

a^0; L^0

=

R
W 0(a^0)
is satisﬁed.
To summarize, W exhibits two types of kinks: those arising at savings choices where
the agent is indiﬀerent between working or not and those arising where constraints change
from non-binding to binding. Kinks at indiﬀerence points can not be optimal choices and
are therefore irrelevant. Kinks at constraint boundaries are only relevant when tomorrow’s
choice may become infeasible aer a small change in today’s choice. e lower bound of
saving nothing tomorrow is irrelevant, because saving nothing is feasible regardless of to-
day’s choices.e upper bound of saving everything is also irrelevant when the agent’s pref-
erences satisfy the Inada condition, because consuming nothing is suboptimal. erefore,
neither type of kink interferes with the application of ﬁrst-order conditions.
¹¹ c^ and c^0 are short-hand for c^ = Ra^+ wL^0   a^0 and c^0 = Ra^0 + wL^00   a^00.

Fixed Costs of Capital Adjustment: In many markets, there are ﬁxed costs associated
with adjusting capital stocks. For example, expanding oﬃce space involves searching for a
new building, transporting furniture, and so on. Khan andomas () and Bachmann,
Caballero and Engel () study the impact of ﬁxed costs on investment over the busi-
ness cycle. ey apply the envelope theorem of Benveniste and Scheinkman () to the
benchmark model of no ﬁxed costs but fall back on numerical methods in the general case.
We show that the value function is diﬀerentiable at all optimal capital adjustment levels.
More generally, this application illustrates how to analyze problems in which the optimal
one-period interior choice condition of eorem  fails. e techniques explored here are
also applicable to more general adjustment costs, as well as irreversible investment, and
problems with bid-ask spreads.
A ﬁrm has access to a production technology that allows it to use k units of capital to
produce f(k) units of output, where f is diﬀerentiable. e market price of the output is
normalized to 1. e capital stock k depreciates at rate . e ﬁrm may adjust the capital
stock at any time, but this requires a ﬁxed cost of c units of output. If it decides to pay this
ﬁxed cost, then it may buy or sell units of capital at a price of pk. e ﬁrm discounts future
proﬁts at rate , and has the following dynamic programming problem:
W (k) = max
(
f (k) + W ((1  ) k) ;
maxk00 f (k)  c  pk
 
k0
1    k

+  W (k0) :
We assume that there is some return to investment and that the ﬁrm prefers not to allow
the capital stock to depreciate to nothing, i.e.
 c+max
k
1X
t=0
tf((1  )tk) >
1X
t=0
tf(0):
e value function W has downward kinks at capital levels k where the ﬁrm is in-
diﬀerent between making an adjustment or not. Moreover, when the ﬁrm changes from
non-adjustment to adjustment (in either direction), it pays a ﬁxed cost which might cause
a downward jump in its proﬁts. is could potentially lead to upward kinks in the value
function. Below, we apply eorem  to establish: if k^0 > 0 is an optimal choice given k
that involves an adjustment (i.e. k^0 6= (1  ) k), then the value functionW is diﬀerentiable
at k^0 and satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
pk
1   =  W
0(k^0):
eﬁrm sets themarginal cost of adjustment equal to themarginal future beneﬁt. Since
neither depend on the prior capital stock, there is no history dependence in the capital stock

choice once an adjustment decision has been made. erefore, the ﬁrm repeats through
ﬁnite cycles in which the capital depreciates and is replenished periodically according to
the Euler equation.
We reformulate the problem into the notation of Problem :
~W (k; a) =
(
maxa02f0;1g f (k) +  ~W [(1  ) k; a0] if a = 0,
maxk00;a02f0;1g f (k)  c  pk
 
k0
1    k

+  ~W (k0; a0) if a = 1.
e optimal one-period interior choice condition of eorem  is satisﬁed if (i) a = 1
and k^0 > 0, and (ii) a^0 = 1. In other words, eorem  applies if the agent makes two
adjustments in a row. However, the condition is violated if there is no adjustment in the
following period, because a small change in the capital level k^0 chosen today would imply
a small change in the capital level (1  ) k^0 “chosen” tomorrow. Nevertheless, we establish
thatW is diﬀerentiable at any optimal capital choice k^0 > 0.
In the case that the ﬁrm waits before readjusting, we may still apply eorem  by
bundling the waiting periods together with the ﬁrst adjustment period into one single pe-
riod. If the ﬁrm waits n periods before readjusting, the optimal capital level k^0 maximizes¹²
f (k)  c  pk

k0
1     k

+  f(k0) +   + n f  (1  )n 1 k0
+ n+1 ~W ((1  )n k0; 1) :
Equivalently, the optimal capital level n periods into the future K^ 0 maximizes
f (k)  c  pk

K 0
(1  )n+1   k

+  f

K 0
(1  )n

+   + n f

K 0
(1  )1

+ n+1 ~W (K 0; 1):
We may reinterpret eorem  by treating the ﬂow utility functions as all of the terms
before the continuation value.¹³ Now, the optimal one-period interior choice condition is
that (i) a = 1 and K^ 0 > 0, and (ii) an adjustment will be made in the reformulated “to-
morrow.” By construction, adjustments are made in both periods, so this condition is met.
erefore, eorem  implies that ~W (; 1) is diﬀerentiable at K^ 0 = (1  )n 1 k^0.
¹² We assumed earlier that the ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to allow the capital stock to depreciate to
nothing.
¹³ is interpretation of the problem is non-stationary, in that the ﬁrst period has a diﬀerent ﬂow value
function from the subsequent periods. As discussed earlier, eorem  generalizes easily to non-stationary
problems, because the discrete choice can include a time index.

Next, we establish thatW is subdiﬀerentiable at k^0.e continuation valueW is bound-
ed below by the value function from choosing non-adjustment for n periods,
H(k0) = f(k0) +   + n f((1  )n 1 k0) + n+1 ~W ((1  )n k0; 1) :
By construction, H(k^0) = W (k^0), and H inherits diﬀerentiability at k^0 from ~W (; 1) (as
established above).erefore, part (ii) of Lemma  implies thatW is subdiﬀerentiable at k^0.
Finally, since k^0 maximizes
 pk k
0
1   +  W (k
0) ;
this objective is superdiﬀerentiable at k^0 by Lemma . Moreover, each term is subdiﬀer-
entiable, so the objective is diﬀerentiable by Lemma . us, W may be expressed as the
diﬀerence of two functions that are diﬀerentiable at k^0. is completes the proof that at any
optimal choice k^0 > 0, the ﬁrst-order condition
pk
1   =  W
0

k^0

is satisﬁed.
Numerical Analysis: Our results may be useful for numerical analysis. Fella () ap-
plies our theorems in his generalization of the endogenous grid method of Carroll ().
He ﬁnds his method is substantially faster and more accurate than discretization methods.
A Banach Space Version
For many dynamic programming problems, there are several continuous choices (we al-
ready accommodated arbitrary “discrete” choice spaces above). We generalize our concepts
and results to multidimensional spaces, which we number in the same way as in the main
text for ease of reference.
Let (X; kk) be a Banach space (for example,X could be Rn). We denote
X = f : X ! R such that  is linear and continuousg
as its topological dual space.e standard notion of diﬀerentiability in Banach spaces is due
to Fréchet.

DeﬁnitionA.. A function f : X ! R is Fréchet diﬀerentiable at x if there is some 2 X
such that
lim
x!0
f(x+x)  f(x)  x
kxk = 0:
 is called the Fréchet derivative of f at x, and may be written as f 0(x) or fx(x).
eorem A.. Suppose F is the upper envelope of a (possibly inﬁnite) set of Fréchet diﬀer-
entiable functions ff(; d)g. If (c^; d^) maximizes f , then F is Fréchet diﬀerentiable at c^ with
F 0(c^) = fc(c^; d^) = 0.
e statement of the generalization ofeorem  is identical to the original, apart from the
use of Fréchet derivatives.
eorem A.. Suppose (c^0; c^00; d^0; d^00) are optimal choices following (c; d) in Problem  (in
which the utility functions are Fréchet diﬀerentiable in the analogous way). If c^0 is a one-period
interior choice with respect to (c; c^00; d; d^0; d^00), then V (; d^0) is Fréchet diﬀerentiable at c^0 and
satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
  uc0(c; c^0; d; d^0) =  Vc(c^0; d^0) =  uc(c^0; c^00; d^0; d^00): ()
Notice that the following proofs are shorter than the standard proofs (because we do not
have to deal with le and right limits), however this comes at the cost of a loss in economic
intuition. We keep the order and numbering similar to the proofs in Section  but we omit
all the surrounding text, discussing these results.
Deﬁnition A.. e Fréchet subdiﬀerential of f : X ! R is
@Ff(x) =

 2 X : lim inf
x!0
f(x+x)  f(x)  x
kxk  0

;
and f is Fréchet subdiﬀerentiable if @Ff(x) is non-empty. Similarly, the Fréchet super-diﬀer-
ential of f is
@Ff(x) =

 2 X : lim sup
x!0
f(x+x)  f(x)  x
kxk  0

;
and f is Fréchet superdiﬀerentiable if @Ff(x) is non-empty.
For completeness, we prove the following standard result which generalizes Lemma .

Lemma A.. A function f : X ! R is Fréchet diﬀerentiable if and only if it is both Fréchet
sub- and superdiﬀerentiable.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that diﬀerentiable functions are sub- and superdif-
ferentiable. Conversely, suppose f is both Fréchet sub- and superdiﬀerentiable, so that
 2 @Ff(x) and  2 @Ff(x). en from the deﬁnitions,
lim inf
x!0
f(x+x)  f(x)  x
kxk  0;
lim sup
x!0
f(x+x)  f(x)  x
kxk  0:
e second inequality may be rewritten as
lim inf
x!0
 f(x+x)  f(x)  
x
kxk  0:
From the superadditivity of limits inferior, we deduce
lim inf
x!0

f(x+x)  f(x)  x
kxk  
f(x+x)  f(x)  x
kxk

 0
lim inf
x!0
[   ] xkxk  0:
But this ﬁnal equality is only satisﬁed when  = . erefore, the Fréchet sub- and su-
perdiﬀerentials coincide on a singleton, which must be the Fréchet derivative.
Lemma A.. e following statements are true at any c:
(i) If g and h are Fréchet subdiﬀerentiable, then so is g + h.
(ii) g is Fréchet subdiﬀerentiable if and only if g is Fréchet superdiﬀerentiable.
(iii) If g and h are Fréchet subdiﬀerentiable and g+ h is Fréchet superdiﬀerentiable, then g,
h, and g + h are Fréchet diﬀerentiable.
Lemma A.. If c^ 2 int(C) is a maximum of f : C ! R, then f is superdiﬀerentiable at c^
with 0 2 @Ff(c^).
Proof. Since c^ is a maximum, f(c^+c) f(c^)  0 for suﬃciently smallc 2 X . Dividing
by kck and taking limits gives
lim sup
c!0
f(c^+c)  f(c^)
kck  0:
erefore 0 2 @Ff(c^).

Lemma A.. If F is the upper envelope of a set of Fréchet diﬀerentiable functions ff(; d)g,
and c 2 int(C), and F (c) = f(c; d), then F is subdiﬀerentiable with fc(c; d) 2
@FF (c
).
Proof. If F (c) = f(c; d), then we have
f (c +c; d)  f (c; d)  F (c +c)  F (c) :
Subtracting c, dividing by kck, and taking limits on both sides gives
lim inf
c!0
f (c +c; d)  f (c)  c
kck  lim infc!0
F (c +c)  F (c)  c
kck :
Aer setting  = fc(c; d), the le side is zero. erefore, the right side is non-negative,
so fc(c; d) 2 @FF (c).
LemmaA.. Suppose (c^0; d^0) are optimal choices given (c; d) in Problem. If c 2 int( (; c^0; d; d^0)),
then the value function V (; d) is subdiﬀerentiable at c with uc(c; c^0; d; d^0) 2 @DV (c; d).
Proof. is proof is omitted; it is straightforward to adapt the proof of Lemma  using the
technique in the proof of Lemma .
Lemma A.. Suppose F is the upper envelope of the set of functions ff (; d)g, and that
F (c) = f(c; d).
(i) If F is Fréchet superdiﬀerentiable at c, then f(; d) is also Fréchet superdiﬀerentiable
at c.
(ii) If f(; d) is Fréchet subdiﬀerentiable at c, then F is also Fréchet subdiﬀerentiable at
c.
Proof. Weonly provide a proof for part (i). SinceF is Fréchet superdiﬀerentiable at c, there
is some  2 @FF (c) with
lim sup
x!0
F (x+x)  F (x)  x
kxk  0:
Since F (c)  f(c; d), we know that
F (c +c)  F (c)  f (c +c; d)  f (c; d) :
Subtracting c, dividing by kck and taking limits on both sides yields
lim sup
x!0
F (c +c)  F (c)  c
kck  lim supx!0
f (c +c; d)  f (c; d)  c
kck :
From the ﬁrst inequality, the le side is less than 0, which establishes that  2 @Ff(c; d).

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